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ANNOUNCEMENT.
With the opening of the present term, two new members of

the faculty, Professor A~ustin Tappan Wright, A. B., LL. B., and
Mr. Layton B. Register, B. S., LL. B., took up their duties at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School
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Professor Wright comes from the University of California Law
School, where he was a professor of law for a number of yeats.
He is a graduate of Harvard University and of the Harvard Law
School, and has spent some time in study at Oxford. From i9o8
until 192! he was engaged in active practice, first in Boston, and
later in San Francisco. In San Francisco he was assistant counsel
for the United States Shipping Board and for the United States
Emergency Fleet Corporation. Professor Wright will conduct the
second and third year courses in Associations and also the newly
added course in Admiralty Law.
Mr. Register is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania
and of the University ef Pennsylvania Law School. He has spent
a large amount of time in foreign legal study, and has translated a
number of foreign works. From 1914 to 1917 he was a lecturer in
the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Since 1917 he has
been in active practice in Philadelphia. Mr. Register comes to the
Law School as assistant to the Dean, and in addition to this work,
he will teach the course on Damages.

NOTES.
THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE OF VVIT-

NESSEs.-During the period last winter when the United States Senate was conducting investigations which produced such wide public
interest, a constitutional question of great importance was raised
by the refusal of Mfally S. Daugherty to appear before a Senate
Committee which was investigating the actions of his brother, the
then Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty. His refusal gave rise
to the question whether or not the Senate had power to force him
to appear before it to give testimony. Upon his refusal to appear,
Daugherty was arrested by order of the Senate, to be brought before
it; and on a writ of habeas corpus obtained for his release, his
discharge was ordered on the ground that the Senate had no power
under the Constitution to conduct this investigation, and that it had
acted without authority in ordering Daugherty to .appear and in ordering his arrest.
Z229 Fed. 620 (1924). decided May 2ist, Judge Cochran of the Eastern
District of Kentucky sitting by designation in the Southern District of Ohio.

NOTES

Having reviewed the facts of the case and the two Senate iresolrtions, the first authorizing the investigation, 2 the second ordering
the arrest of 'Mally S. Daugherty, s Judge Cochran in his .opinion
proceeds to analyze with great care the four more important cases 4
relied upon by counsel. Only one of these, the case of Kilbourne v.
Thomnpson.5 he finds to be directly in point, and this is decisive of
the case at bar. There the House of Representatives authorized an
investigation of a certain "real estate pool" in order to ascertain
what settlement had been made by the "pool" with the trustee in
bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Co.. which had had an interest in it.
Jay Cooke & Co. were bankrupt creditors of the United States.
One Kilburn, refusing to testify or to produce docunjents, was imprisoned for contempt and in an action against the sergeant at arms
for false imprisonment, the United States Supreme Court held that
the investigation was judicial in nature, concerning a private enterprise,' and therefore the House was exercising a judicial function
given it neither expressly nor impliedly by the Constitution.
After examining these authorities, the Court goes on to decide
the case. It was the contention of counsel for the respondent that
this investigation of Attorney General Daugherty was for the purpose of acquiring information to aid in future legislation by the
Senate, and that. since a House of Congress has power to compel
attendance of witnesses for that purpose, its action in arresting
Daugherty was valid. The Court states that no case has ever de-

termined that either House has this power.7 In Kilbourne v. Thompson 8 the question is put aside as unnecessary to its decision. The
necessities of this case, the Court continues "do not require that I

'Sen. Res. 157, Sixty-eighth Congress, first session, Cong. Rec., Vol. 65,
p. 3409.
'Sen. Res. 215. Sixty-eighth Congress, first session, Cong. Rec., Vol. 65,
p. 7217.

"Anderson v. Dunn. 6 Wheat. 2o4 (iq20: Kilbourne v. Thompson, io3
U. S. i68 (xicoh): In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (i8f6); Marshall v. Gordon. 243 U. S.521 (igx6).
' Supra. in note 4.
"The Court there states, at page i9o. "'We are sure that no person can
be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his tes-

timony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to

inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these bodies possess the
general pover of making inquiry into the private affaits of the citizen."
'The Court cites decision of State courts for the proposition that Congress as a whole may have this power, but doubts whether each Houe has it.

'Supra, in note 4.
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It will be noted that in
should pass on this question,
the second resolution (which ordered the sergeant at arms to arrest
Daugherty) the Senate has expressly avowed that the investigation
is in aid of other action th'an legislation. (The first resolution stated
no purpose of the investigation which it authorized.) Its purpose
is to 'obtain information necessary as a basis for such legislative,
and other action, as the Senate may deem necessary andproper. "
The only "other iction" suggested by counsel, he states, is impeachment. The only place where the Senate could impeach the Attorney
General is at the bar of public opinion, and that is beyond its powers. The power .of impeachment rests expressly under the Constitution in the House of Representatives, the trial to be before the
Senate as an impartial judicial body. The Senate in this investigation is acting as prosecutor and exercising a judicial function
expressly denied, because granted to the House of Representatives.
Nor does he decide whether the Senate has power to investigate
an executive department or office. He sthtes, "what the Senate is
engaged in doing is not investigating the Attorney General's office;
it is investigating the former Attorney General," 20 and again, "the
investigation thus authorized was a purely personal one.""2- Thus
it is evident the decision is based upon an interpretation of the nature of the investigation, an interpretation of fact, which brings it
within the ruling of Kilbournc z,. Thompson 22 as it is viewed by
Judge Cochran.$3
The Houses of Congress have long considered it their power separately to summon witnesses before them to furnish information in
'Supra, in note i. p. 638.
1t Sup:'a,
'

in note z, p. 64o.
Supra. in note x, p. 623.

'Supra,

in note 4.

"In the debates upon the floor of the Senate, following the introduction of a resolution to appeal this ca;c, Senator Borah aptly summed up the
decision as follows: "All the Court did decide . . . is that they (the Committee) were not investigating Daugherty as an Attorney General . . . but
that they were going into his personal and private affairs. . . . and the
iecord may have been made up so as to justify the decision." Cong. Rec..
Vol. 6.. p. io8;x (June 5, 1924). If the record contained the hearings of
the Committee. there is no doubt of the Court's right to base its decision not
only upon what the resolution authorized, but upon what was being done in
pursuance thereof. However. from the opinion itself, it is not clear that he
did so, for he seems to base his decision entirely on the fact that the resolution on its face showed an intent to investigate the private affairs of a person
and not a government office. This conclusion, a reading of the resolution
alone does not seem to justify.

NOTES

aid of legislation. 14 While it is stated by Judge Cochran that on only
two previous occasions have they attempted to compel a witness to
testify in an investigation in aid of legislation, that must of necessity be because such witnesses have at all other times appeared willingly, for the branches of Congress have often in the past conducted such investigations. Judge Cochran, while not deciding the
point, 5 has "serious doubt as to the existence of such power" and
cites, to support his doubt, a dictum from the opinion (f Kilbourne
v. Thoimpson. 2 Also he quotes from an address of Charles Sumner, delivered in the Senate on June 15, I86o, an extract denying
the existence of the power.
This power to compel witiesses to testify, coupled with the
power to punish for refusal is vested in the courts."" From this fact
Judge Cochran implies that either House of Congress, to possess it,
must possess judicial powers. The .ConstitutiQn vests the judicial
power of the United States in the courts "I and under the theory of
separation of powers, the legislative branch of the government can
have only such judicial powers as are expressly or impliedly given
it by the Constitution. The Houses of Congi ess are expressly given
such powers in the cases of impeachment, of judging elections, of
returns and qualifications of their members, and of punishing their
members ;" therefore if they have them further, they must be implied. Impliedly they have the power to punish outsiders for contempt where it is necessary for the proper exercise of their legislative functions, namely, in cases of misbehavior and of disobedience2o
But since the power to punish for disobedience predicates the right
to command obedience, we come back to the same question; whether
"See Cong. Globe. 859-i86o, Part

2,

3, P. -2o07 and Vol. 65, p. 10874.

p.

11o2;

Cong. Rec., Vol. 4, Part

"On this fact. Senator Borah states, "I think the decision is weak so
far as establishing any principles which may guide the Senate in future are
concerned. . . . For instance, the Court does not decide the question as to
our right to investigate a department, . . . an Attorney General or a Secretary of State. Ile does not decide the question of our right to inquire for
purposes of legislation. Those are the things in which we are interested."
Cong. Rec., Vol. 65, p. io87i, June 5, 1924.

"Supra, in note 4. P. 189. "Nor . . . is much aid given to the doctrine
that this power exists as one necessary to enable either House of Congress
to exercise successfully their function of legislation."
" Wigmore, Evidence, sections 2190 to 2195.
"Art. III.
"Art. I, sec. 2, par. 5; sec. 3, par. 6; .sec. 5, pars. i and 2.
"See cases supra, in note 4.
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in an investigation in aid of legislation they have that right, i.e.,
authority to command witnesses to testify. Whether we call it a
judicial function or not is of small moment, for, no matter what we
call it, it may be implied, if it is a necessary accessory to a proper
exercise of powers granted to the Houses of Congress.
As Judge Cochran quotes from Anderson v. Dunn, 1 "The
genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of
implied powers." However, the Constitution does not purport to
set forth a conclusive enumeration of all the powers to be exercised by the departments of government; that, as Alexander Hamilton
pointed out in The Federalist,"2 would have been humanly impossible. The above quotation relies, on the other hand, upon the
Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." But this does not say "expressly delegated" and still leaves the possibility of implied powers. "Implied
power is the accessory power possessed to prevent the right to exert powers given from being obstructed or destroyed." 23 That gives
us the final question: will the right of each House of Congress to
pass upon legislation be obstructed or destroyed unless it can compel witnesses to testify?
The grant of such a power to the government means the withdrawal of a right from the individual citizen, the right not to disclose information which is his own. But the argument is not in point
that it is an unwarranted restriction of the rights of the people.
By-the adoption of the Constitution certain powers, both express and
implied, were given to the Government, and certain rights were
thereby given up by the people. If this power is necessary, it was
granted at that time, and the right given up then, and it does not
fall within those rights guaranteed to the people by that same instrument. So it is also as to the argument that the power will be
?abused. The courts, the ultimate protectors of our liberties, must
remedy that. The power either was or was not granted by the
Constitution, which depends solely upon whether or not it is a
necessary adjunct to the function of each House.
This final question must be answered in the affirmative. There
can be small doubt that under the clause in the Constitution author'Supra. in note 4.
"The Federalist. Nos. 33 and 44.

'Marshall

v. Gordon, supra, in note 4.

NOTES

izing Congress to make laws "necessary and.proper"24 for carrying
into execution the powers expressly granted, Congress as a whole
can pass a valid law empowering investigation and compulsory attendance of witnesses in aid of legislation. It is the function of
Congress to pass laws. In a country so vast, containing so many
complex interests, these laws must deal with subjects varied and
ofttimes intricate. To treat these subjects adequately the members
of Congress require a knowledge which in many cases none of them
possess. They must get information from outside sources, and
where the Executive Departments do not have it to give, the sources
must be those private citizens who do. No doubt in most cases it
will be voluntarily given, but suppose it is not. Must not Congress
have power to force them to give it? If not, it may be prevented
from drafting proper and adequate laws on a subject needing them.
It is necessary then that Congress have this power.
Admitting Congress as a whole to have this power by means
of legislation, we must still prove that each branch of Congress
has it in itself without legislation. It may be said that since each
House has a means of getting information by joint action, this
further means is not necessary. But each has power to act independently and without regard to the other house; each can separately initiate and pass upon any bill it deems fit. 25 This being
true, each must have independent means of obtaining the information vital to such action. Otherwise its independence .is
destroyed.
By refusing to allow it to obtain necessary information, the Senate
might deprive the House of its separate right to pass upon a bill.
The fact that such bill cannot become law without concurrence by the
Senate, cannot withdraw from the House its right to act. Since
otherwise its right to independent.action is ",,bstructed or destroyed,"
each House of Congress must have this implied power to force witnesses to testify in aid of legislation."6
The decision of the principal case, then, is correct on what
may be a proper construction of the facts, but it would seem that the
inference by the court that the Senate cannot compel attendaiize
of witnesses in aid of legislation is incorrect.

G.S.S.
'Art. T. sec. 8,par. 18.

"This follows from the tenor of Art. I; see in particular sec. 5, pars.
i.2. 3 and 4, and sec. 7,pars. x and . The Senate cannot initiate revenue
hills.
"The information sought must. of course, be essential to proper action.
Whether it is or not, the courts ultimately in a given case must decide.
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Til E POLLUTION OF STREAMS BY N'NATER PUMPED FROM 'MINES.

--"The ownership of land carries with it two beneficial incidentseach of which has come to be recognized as a legal right-the
'right! of exclusive occupation, enjoyment and dominion, and the
'right' to. utilize it for the owner's social and economic purposes.
When these two rights conflict which is to prevail?" -A very important branch of law revolves about this conflict. In order to break
a deadlock produced by the conflict of one owner's right to "enjoyment and dominion," and another owner's "right to utilize it (his
land) for the owner's social and economic purposes," obviously some
external force must be exerted. That force has been supplied by
the economic interest of the public which may be directly or indiredly involved; and the development of this very important part
which economic pressure has played in settling these disputes has
been admirably and fully set forth by Francis H. Bohlen in his
article, "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher." 2 It is the purpose of
this note to deal only with that phase of the question relating to
the rights of riparian owners to use and pollute streams on their
property.
At the outset a very great difference is noticed between the
attitude which was taken by the courts of England on this question
and that taken by the courts of this country, a result, principally,
of the difference between a country which had reached the height of
its development aid one in which the development of the natural
resources was in its infancy.3 Land in England is regarded as a
private domain, while in this country it has always been regarded as
a productive asset.4 The American attitude has probably best been
stated by Earl, C., in Losee v. Buchanan I where he said: "So, too,
the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed
use and possession of my real estate and that I must so use it as not
to injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the
social state. We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and
railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind,
and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any of these
upon my land and they are not a nuisance and not managed so as
'Francis H. Bohlen. -9 U. or PA. L RM.317.
'59 U. oF PA. L REv. 298. r73, 423.
'59 U. oF PA. L. REV. 31&
59 U. OF PA. L Rzv. 319, 384.
a 1 N. Y. 476 (1873).

OTES

to become such, I am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He received his compensation for such damages by the general good in which he shares
and the right which be has to place the same things upon his
lands. I may not place a nuisance upon my land to the damage of
my neighbor and I have my compensation for the surrender of
this right to use my own as I will by the similar restriction imposed upon my neighbor for my benefit. I hold my pr'operty subject to the risk that it may unavoidably of accidentally be injured by
those who live near me; and as I move about on the public highways and other places where persons may lawfully be, I take the
risk of being accidentally injured in my person by them without fault
on their part. Most of the rights of property, as well as of persons,
in the social study are but relative and they must be so arranged
and modified in unnecessarily infringing on natural rights, as upon
the whole to promote the general welfare."
It may be well to restate.6 in outline form, the development of
the law dealing with this conflict. The law in England has been
largely governed by the decision in Rylands v.Fletcher," which case
decided that one whio collects upon his land foreign substances likely
to escape, must confine them at his peril. The development of any
right to invade the dominional rights of a land owner has been very
slow. But a business use of land has finally become tolerated at the
expense of property rights in certain localities,' with, however, the
reservation that private land cannot be actually invaded however
important the business operation.'
In America the first step was taken in the passage of acts
permitting the construction of dams for use in the operation of
certain "serviceable" mills such as saw mills and grist mills.10 These
were followed by acts permitting the use of water for power in the
operation of private mills although they were very uncommon until
after the Revolution, 1 and the right to use water for private man'Note

'L

i.supra. where the subject is fully treated.

L 3 H. L 330 (x%8).

'Jones v. Powell. Palmer 53- (Eng. 162-1); Bramwell, B., in Brarnford v.
Turnley, 3 B. & S. 66 (Eng. 1862), at p. 83.
'St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping. ii H. L C 641 (1865).
"*A sketch of the history of these acts is contained in Mr. Justice Gray's
opinion in Head v. Amoskeog Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9 (1884).

,59 U. op PA. L. Ray. 376.

68

UNIVERSITY OF PENSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

ufacture gradually grew to be considered on the same basis with
2
its use for farming and residential purposes.
It would seem that the right to pollute streams should be governed by the same principles as the right to use water from a stream
to the detriment of lower riparian owners, and it has been held
that a riparian owner can pollute a stream by draining his land into
it to make it fit for farming purposes, for building and for other
natural uses." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Sanderson v.
The Coal Co.,"4 applying the principle of these cases-the necessity
for development of the natural resources and the very great interest
of the public-held that a mining company which artificially pumped
water from the bottom of their mines (an operation necessary in order to get out the coal) to a place on the surface from which it ran
into a stream, thereby polluting it, was not liable in damages to a
lower riparian owner who was deprived of the use of the stream
for domestic purposes; that "a mere private personal inconvenience, arising in this way and under such circumstances, must yield
to the necessities of a great public industry, which, although in the
hands of a private corporation, subserves a great public interest." 15
The Sanderson case has been eriicised severely on the ground
that in accepting as a "natural" use the artificial pumping of the
water from the mines, the Court has placed too broad a meaning on
the word, and that the ruling in this case might be applied to manufacturing and other purposes not directly connected with what is
correctly a natural use of the land. 26 But it is submitted, that in
view of subsequent Pennsylvania decisions which have more fully
defined and limited the rule in the Sanderson case this particular
criticism has been shown'to be somewhat unjustified inasmuch as
that case has been regarded as authority for only those cases in
"See Savage, C. J.. in Arnold v. Foot. 12 Wend. 330 (N. Y. 1834), p. 331;
Carey v. Daniels. 49 Mass. 466 (1844)
; and authorities collected in 59 U. oF
PA. L REv. 379 n.
"Tuttle v. Goodale. 29 N. Y. 459 (1864): Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn.
4.36, 61 N. l- 462 ('894): Howard v. Bibb County, 1.2/- Ga. 29i, s6 S. E.
.18 (907) ; Helfrich v. Calonsville Water Co.. 74. Md. 269, 22 Atd. 72 (1891);
McAvoy v. Taylor, 56 Wash. 357. zo5 Par. 851 (29o9).
i113 Pa. 126, 6 AtL. 45 (1886).
From the opinion of Clark, J., p. 149 of Sanderson v. Coal Co., supra,

is 59 U. or PA. L. R'v. 3m

NOTES

which the defendant was actually developing the natural resjurces
of his own land."'
There is, on the other hand, a very important criticism to le
directed at many of the courts which have dealt with that case.
Many of them have dipped down into the opinion of the Court
and extracted a rule, taken from the words of Justice Clark and
have called it the "Pennsylvania Doctrine." It has been frequently
stated to be, "that every man has the right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, and if whilst lawfully in such use
and enjoyment without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to his neighbor, it is daninum absquc injuria." "
In speaking of the rule in Pennsylvania Vann, J., in Strobel v.
Kerr Salt Co.,"9 recognizes as the reasons for the rule the importance
of coal mining in that state-not that the interest of the p'iblic
in that particular case tipped the balance in favor of the defindant
who was a coal miner-and says that the Sandcrson case "held that
one operating a coal mine in the ordinary and usual manner may,
upon his own lands' drain or pump the water that percolates into
his mine into a stream which forms the natural drainage basin in
which the mine is situate, although the quantity of water may
thereby be increased, and its quality so affected as to render it
totally unfit for domestic purposes by the lower riparian owners";
and there are words, stated without qualification by Clark, J.,
in the
which if taken alone are misleading. He says: ". .
operation of mining, in the ordinary and usual manner, (a miner)
may upon his own lands, lead the water which percolates into his
mine, into the streams which form .thenatural drainage of thi basin,
in which the coal is situate; altho the quantity as well as the quality
of the water in the stream may thereby be affected."
"See Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (x889), where the defendant manufactured coke from coal not mined on his own land but brought
there for the purpose; Harvey v. Coal Co., 2oi Pa. 63, 5o Ati. 770 (i9o2),
where. the defendant "was enjoined from breaking up coal and preparing it,
after it was nfined. in such manner that the dust, thereby produced, injured
the plaintiff's land; Sullivan v. The Steel Co., 2o8 Pa. 540, 57 AtL io65
(i9o4), where the defendant was enjoined from operating furnaces in such
manner as to produce dust injurious to the plaintiff ; and Hauck v. -The Pipe
Line Co.. 153 Pa. 366, 26 At. 644 (893). where oir brought from a distance and kept upon the defendant's land escaped and percolated into the plaintiff's springs and wells..
'Evans v. The Fertilizer Co., i6o Pa. 214, 28 Atl. 702 (1894); Pfeiffer
v. Brown, x65 Pa. 267, 3o Al. 844 (895).
1164
9
N. Y. 303, at p. 319, 58 N. E. 142 at p. 146 (goo).
"Sanderson v. The Coal Co., supra, at p. x4g.
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It was this "Penhsylvania Rule". rigidly and narrowly stated,
as pointed out above, which had- to be met by the. Supreme Court
in the two recent cases of Penna. R. R. Co. v. Sagmore Coql Co.",
etc. and The Dunbar IJater Supply Co. v. Same Dcfcndants,"
which were simultaneously decided. In those cases the defendants,
in the process of mining coal on their property dumped water into
the stream from which the plaintiffs obtained water used for domestic purposes, in the one case to supply the railroad and in the
other to supply the inhabitants of Dunbar Township, and the Court
granted an injunction restraining-the defendants on the ground that
the benefit to the public, in this particular case, would be greater
if the nuisance were abated, than if allowed to continue 23
This decision seems to have uprooted the "Pennsylvania Rule"
from the ground upon which it recently rested and where it has
been rather badly treated, to place it safely not on a new, but on
its old foundation. The Court was guided by the reasons and principles upon which ,the Sanderson case was decided, not by any rule
which it has been the effort of courts to'extract from the opinion in
that case. It recognized that "the most important function of
modem tort law is, not so much to formulate definite legal rules, as
to apply fundamental and traditional conceptions of justice to the
solution of new social and economic problems." 24 Thus the rule
in Pennsylvania is not that "a man may develop the natural resources of his mining land, if done without 'negligence, regardless
of the consequences to his neighbors"; but that each case is to be
decided by a rational adaptation of broad principles of justice and
social convenience to the facts of the particular case, always with
cognizance of, and deference to, the rights and interests of the
public, as well as of. the parties litigant, which may be involVed.
C. E. K.
No. J82, Jan. Terin, 1z2, Pa. Supreme Ctn Case No. 183, Jan. Term, 1924, Pa. Supreme Ct.

"Case

o9 (x8g6),
OW.
'See also Commonwealth v. Russell, 172 Pa. 5o6, 33
which seems to be directly in point. There, pollution by the operation of
oil wells was enjoined on the same ground as in *the instant case. Also see
Commonwealth v. Emmers, 33 Pa. Super. 131 (i9o7), at p. iA8, where the
suggestion is made that whether the Sanderson case controls as against the
public, "is quite a different question."

"59 U. 6F PA. L REv. 317.,

NOTES
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A PAtNT'S TESTIMONY AS TO NONACCESS TO PROVE ILLEGITIMACV.-From time immemorial at com-

mon law, there has existed the so-called presumption of legitimacy,
that a child born to a married woman is the child of her husband.1
As first applied this presumption was conclusive, and no opportunity
was given to dispute it. With the gradual development of civilization, however, the law began to recognize the extremely unfortunate
situation in which the father was placed, and relaxed its strict rule
somewhat. Today this presumption of legitimacy may be prevented
from arising in a particular case if either impotency or non-access
can be shown.- In proving this non-access, to what extent may the
testimony of the parents themselves be admitted?
The earliest case in which this question arose was a proceeding to determine in which of two parishes certain pauper children
were settled. This depended on their legitimacy. "Insisted that
the wife was not good evidence it being against her husband. But
not allowed for the parishes are only concerned." - In the case of
Rex v. Reading 4 however, testimony of the wife alone as to nonaccess was not considered sufficient to bastardize her child, Lord
Hardwicke saying: "It must be a very dangerous consequence to
lay it down in general that a wife should be a sufficient sole evidence
to bastardize her child and to discharge her husband of the burden
of his maintenance." This conception was followed in Rex v.
Bcdel s and Re." v.' Rook,* and became well settled for the time
being. Then came the celebrated case of Goodright v. M!oss7 where
Lord Mansfield, with characteristic impressiveness and finality, said:
"The law of England is clear that testimony of a father or mother
cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue born after marriage ...
It is a rule founded on decency, morality, and policy, that they
shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they have had
This sonorous utterance seems hardly to have
no connection."
been justified by the precedents we have examined. It applied to
' Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol.

2, p. 398.
'Phipson's Law of Evidence (6th ed.), p. 198; 33 HARV. L REv. 3o6.
Either non-access or impotency must be proved, and it is not enough to
show that the wife was living in open adultery. Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige
Ch. 139 (X. Y. 1832) ; Gordon v. Gordon, (xgo3) Prob. 141.
'St. Andrews v. St. Brides, Ses. Cas. K. B. 35 (Eng. 1717).
'Temp. Hardw. 79 (Eng. 1734).
'Temp. Hardw. 379 (Eng. 173;).
'x Wits. 340 (Eng. x752).

X2 Cowp. 591 (Eng. 1777).
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all cases whatever, while the rule of Rex v. Reading applied only
to filiation cases. It applied to both parents, while the former
rule applied only to the wife. Finally it excluded the testimony
absolutely, while the former practice admitted the testimony but refused to sustain the verdict based solely upon it. Nevertheless, so
great was the weight of Lord Mansfield's opinions that his statement
was soon approved of and followed 8 and the law became well settled
in accordance with it." The passage of the Evidence Further Amendment Act in 1869 " led to a reconsideration of the question, but
this statute has been construed as not having changed the rule.""1
In the United States,, the first case involving this question
was Commonwealth v. Strickcr,'- where -the English rule as laid
down by Mansfield was cited and approved. Since then the doctrine
has become firmly established in the law of this country. 3 In full
accord with the English precedents, statutes similar to the Evidence
Further Amendment Act have been similarly construed. "' In one
respect, however, it would seem that our courts have extended the
rule too far, by having excluded testimony of pre-marital non-access,
when it developed that the wife was pregnant at the time of marriage.15 The English courts, indeed, have refused to apply the doctrine to such a case,"' and we can well agree with Lord Halsbury
'Rex v. Luffe, 8 East 193 (Eng. i87); Rex v. Rea,
i8og).

12

East 132 (Eng.

'Cope v. Cope. i Mann. R. 269 (Eng. 1833); Rex v. Sourton, 5 Ad. &
El. 188 (Eng. 1836); Wright v. Holdgate, 3 Car. & K. 158 (Eng. i85o);
Legge v. Edmonds, 25 L J: Ch. N. S. 125 (1855).
• 32 and 33 Vict., c. 68, sec. 8: "Parties to any proceedings instituted in
consequence of adultery shall be competent to give evidence in such proceedings."
31See, In re Rideout's Trusts, L. R. xo Eq. Cas. 40 (187o); In re Walker,
53 L. J. 66o (885).
The correctness of this construction was settled in
Russell v. Russell, infra, note 19.
x Browne Appendix, p. 47 (Pa. i8oi).
Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md. 118. 31 At: 498 (1896); Mink -v. State,
6o Wis. 583, 19 N. W. 445 (iS84); Palmer v. Palmer, 79 N. J. Eq. 496, 82
Ati. 358 (092).
"'Chamberlain v. People. 23 N. Y. 85 (186x); Tioga County v. South
Creek Twp.. 75- Pa. 433 (1874); Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N.
W. !54 (x,o); Kennedy v. State, 117 Ark. 113, 173 S. W. 842 (i915). But
see also Comm. v. Rosenblatt, 219 Mass. 197, io6 N. E. 85z (914).
"Dennison v. Page. -9 Pa. 42o (1857) ; State v. Herman, 13 Ired. Law
502 (N. C. 1852); W\allace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N. W. (7 o8).
"Poulett Perrage Case, (i9o3) A. C. 395. The general doctrine is approved of, however, as a rule which "most wisely and properly protects the
sanctity of married intercourse."
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when he says: "Is it conceivable that a man taking to wife a person
whom he imagined to be a pure virgin, and finding out that he had
been deceived
should not be at libeity to say, 'I never had
intercourse with my wife before marriage'?" We notice also, that
American jurisdictions have felt no hesitancy in applying the rule to
divorce cases,27 evidently being willing to extend the doctrine to
proceedings of any nature whatever in which, either -directly or
indirectly, the testimony of the parent tends to bastardize the issue
of his or her lawful marriage 1 '
In the recent case of Russell z'.Russell, 9 the House of Lords
was for the first time confronted with the question whether this
rule should be applied in a divorce case. Three of the five justices
sitting on the case were of the opinion that it should, and consequently the evidence was excluded. It is interesting to note that in
none of the able opinions filed were the American cases mentioned,
the argument being reasoned entirely from the fundamental doctrine as laid down by 'Mansfield.
To support this rule as now applied without exception both
in England and the United States, we must justify it as being
founded in "decency, morality and policy"--the basis given by
Lord Mansfield in its inception.2 0
Mr. Justice Gordon says: 2"
"Many reasons have been given for the rule. Prominent among
them is the idea that the admission of such testimony would be
unseemly and scandalous; and this not so much from the fact that
it reveals immoral conduct on the part of the parents, as because
of the effect it may have on the child who is nof in fault but who
must nevertheless be the chief sufferer thereby. That the parents
should be permitted to bastardize their own issue is a proposition
which shocks our sense of right and decency."
As far as the
doctrine is based on decency and morality, it seems indeed inconsistent to object to evidence as indecent and immoral as coming
from the lips of the parents, when there.is no such objection to the
facts being proved by any other testimony whatsoever: or, to object to
the wife's testimony of non-access when she has always been allowed
" Cross v. Cross, supra, note 2: Corson v. Corson. 44 X. H. 587 (1893);
Boykin v. Boyklin, 7o N. C. -62 (8;4); Wallace v. Wallace, supra, note is.
"See a list of cases collected in Wallace v. Wallace, supra, note is.

1 4(xg)
A. C.687.
"Goodright v. Moss. supra, note 7.
Tioga County v. South Creek Twp., supra, note 14.
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to testify as to her adulterous connections with other men. As far
as the basis of the doctrine lies in not allowing parents to bastardize
their own children by testifying to non-access, it seems again inconsistent not to object to them achieving exactly the same result
by testifying that there was no marriage ceremony, or that the child
was born before marriage. From a practical viewpoint, however,
there is considerable danger in admitting this evidence in a divorce suit. In a contest between a husband and a wife who had
been harmlessly indiscreet, the tendency would be for our impressionable juries to believe the testimony of the former. It must be
remembered also that no corresponding opportunity is offered the
wife whereby she can easily rid herself of her spouse. Then again,
to what an extraordinary state would the law be reduced if this
evidence were admissible in divorce cases and not generally in legitimacy, peerage, and other cases. The same court might well have
to declare the same infant legitimate for purposes of taking title or
property, but illegitimate for purposes of proving adultery.
Regardless, therefore, of the criticisms we may launch at its
sentimentality, its inconsistency, -2 we must recognize that the rule
is now too well established in our law to admit of change other
than by legislation. Realizing this fact, and with the added practical
argument above, there is no clear reason why it should not be applied
to a divorce case as was done in Russell v. Russell.
J.c.w.
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO A CIVIL ACTION OF ASSAULT AND

BATTER.-The right of an individual to maintain a civil action
for injuries to which he has consented has occasioned much differencc of opinion. Well settled principles of law would seem to control the case of consent to an assault as they do numerous other
cases of consent to interference with legally protected rights; yet
courts have found insuperable difficulty in applying these principles to the situation, and have reached unexpected and anomalous
results.
'Mr. Wigmore is particularly vehement in his denunciation of the doctrine. "The truth is that these high-.sounding 'decencies and moralities' are
mere pharisaical afterthoughts, invented to explain an otherwise incomprehensible rule, and having no support in the established facts and policies of
our law. There never was any true precedent for the rule; and there is just
as little reason of policy to maintain it." 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed.),
sections 263, 2o64.

NOTES
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The recent case of Milliken V. Hcddsheihnr1 illustrates the
problem involved. There the plaintiff's intestate voluntarily submitted to the performance of an abortion by the defendant and
died as a result of the operation. The plaintiff, suing in a civil action
of assault and battery, was allowed to recover damages resulting
from the operation, the consent of the iptestate being held no defense to the action. A decision such as this, the principle of whicn
is followed by numerous courts, invites discussion.
The law of torts in its endeavor to regulate the conduct of individuals towards each other has established a series of legally protected rights, the invasion of which constitutes actionable wrong.
But the individual at his pleasure ray waive or abandon these
rights; since they belong to him, the law leaves him free to dispose of them as he pleases. An act otherwise a tort is therefore
not actionable at the suit of a person 3vho has consented to it. Con-'
sent to an entry on land which would otherwise be a trespass is a
defense to an action.2 Consent to a surgical operation or to a physical examination bars an action of assault; ' consent to confinement
bars an action for false imprisonment.' In another field of tort
law, consent to run the risk of accidental harm which would otherwise be actionable as due to the negligence of him who caused it is
a complete defense to an action. 5 The maxim volenti non fit injuria
excludes civil liability.
The above principles would appear to control the case of consent to an assault, whether in breach of the criminal law or not;
yet in two groups of cases, numerous courts have held these principles inapplicable, and have allowed a civil recovery, notwithstanding the consent of the plantiff.
The first group deals with mutual combats. The astounding
proposition is announced in these cases, and they are the overwhelming numerical weight of authority in this country, that where two
persons voluntarily engage in an affray, their consent to fight will
not defeat their right of recovery in a civil action, but that each
2

1io Ohio St 451, x44 N. E. 264 (x924).

'Owens

v. Lewis, 46 Ind. 488 (1874); Sweetser v. Boston R. R., 66 Me.

583 (IS77).
'Latter v. Braddel, so L J. R. N. S. 448 (Eng. Mi8).
'Herd v. Weardale Steel Co., (191s) A. C. 67.
a2 Cooley, Torts (3d Ed.) 1o42; Pollock, Torts (1th ed.) 163.
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is liable to the other for any physical injury inflicted by him during the fight."
The reason for this rule is stated by Cooley: ' "The life of an individual is guarded in the interest of the state, and not in the interest of the individual alone; and not his life only is protected
but his person as well. Consent cannot justify an assault. Consent is generally a full and perfect shield when that is complained
of is a civil injury which was consented to. But in the case of a
breach of the peace it is different. The state is wronged by this
and forbids it on public grounds. If men fight, the state will punish
them. If one is injured, the law will not listen to an excuse based
on a breach of the peace. There are three parties here, one being
the state, which for its own good does not suffer the others to deal
on a basis of contract with the public peace. The rule of law is
therefore clear and unquestionable, that consent to an assault is no
justification."
Th-is reasoning is unconvincing, since it fails to distinguish
criminal from civil liability. Clearly, the consent of the parties to an
affray would not bar a criminal prosecution for breach of the
pcace, for the state is a party to a criminal prosecution and is not
affected by the agreement of the participants. Though a mutual
beating by consenting parties is a wroig against the public, because
a breach of the peace, it is not a wrong as between themselves,
since neither can complain of that to which he has consented.s The
passage from Cooley on which the majority decisions rely, would
change this rule of law excluding civil liability by holding that
the interest of the state in the life and person of its citizens alters
the situation and nullifies the consent of the plaintiff. But what interest has the state in a violation of a private right? It is con'Boulter v. Clark, Buller, N. P. 16 (Eng. 1%47) . Stout v. Wren, 8 N. C. 42o
(i82i); Barholt v. Wright. 45 Ohio St. 177, 12 N. E. 185 (1887); Wi1ey v.
Carpenter, 64 Vt. 213, 23 Ad. 63o (i89i); Grotton v. Glidden, 84 Me. 89,
w At. ioog (i89z); Lund v. Tyler. 115 Iowa 236, 88 N. \V. 333 (19o1);
Thomas v. Riley, r14 I1. App. 5-0 (iqo4): McNeil v. Mullin, 7o Kan. 634,
79Pac. 168 (19o); Morris v. Miller, 83 Neb. 218, 'i9 N. W. 458 (I9o9);
(1922).
Colby v. McClendon, 85 Okla. 293. 2o6 Pac. 2
T .Cooley, Torts (3d ed.) 282.
'Galbraith v. Fleming. 6o Mich. 403. 27 N. V. 581 (1886); Smith v.
Simon, 69 Mich. 48. 37 N. W. 518 (x1888) ;Lykins v. Hamrick, x44 Ky. 80,
Wright v. Starr, 42 Nev. 441, 179 Pac. 877 (1919);
13- S. W. 852 (9i);
Bishop, Non Contract Law, 76; Salmond, Torts k6th ed.) 55c
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cerned solely with the administration of the criminal law, leaving
the individual free to compromise his civil rights as he pleases.
At early common law, the crown had a real interest in every
action of trespass. Until the time of Bracton (A. D. 125o), personal injuries were not the subject of civil action.' The crown could
punish for violation of the criminal law, but the individual had
no civil redress. The writ of trespass introduced a civil remedy, but
the criminal nature of the action was retained. In addition to paying damages to the injured plaintiff, the unsuccessful defendant
was forced to pay an attendant fine to the crown as well. Under,
such circumstances, the parties could not defeat the right of the
crown to the fine by consenting to an affray. 0 The germ of the
theory of the state's interest in the Jife and person of its citizens
so as to make inoperative even in a civil action their consent to a
mutual affray is found in this dual nature of the writ of trespass."'
But by the statute of 5 and 6 .William and Mary,22- the fine to the
crown was abolished, and tre3pass became a civil remedy exclusively.
All interest of the crown in the action thereby ceased. A: dictum
in the early case of Matthwa' v. Olertons decided before the passage
of the statute, that consent is no defense to an action of assault.
has been the starting point of the law on this subject; but cases
which have proceeded on the authority of this dictum, have failed
to realize the peculiar conditions applicable at the time this case
was decided.14
On principle there is nothing to sustain the conclusion that
the state's interest in the life and person of an individual nullifies
his consent to an assault and allows a civil recovery. A person
may consent to whatever he pleases; and it: the absence of fraud, lb
I Jaggard, Torts, &
'"Matthew v. Ollerton, Comb. 2r8 (Eng. 1693).
"See a forthcoming article on this subject, now in manuscript, in the
COLr.MIA LA w RFVIEw,
by Francis H. Bohlen.

":Passed in 1694.
Snpra, note 10.

'4See mipra, note it.
1
'As to what constitutes fraud,
(1,88).

see Hegarty v. Shine, L. R.

4 It.

288
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or special legislation,"i he thereby abandons his civil rights. 'Many of
the cases in which a civil recovery was allowed are correctly decided upon their facts, for in these cases the defendant either retaliated excessively, or injured the plaintiff by methods to which he
had not consented.'? The court, however, in deciding them, used
general language applicable to any case of assault, and would evidently have decided them similarly if the facts had involved a simple breach of the peace.
On the broad question of public policy, a civil recovery should
be refused. The plaintiff's claim is founded on his own illegal
act, and it is a general rule that the law ieaves all who share in
the guilt of an illegal or immoral transaction where it finds them.
The law refuses to countenance such transactions, not out of solicitude
for the parties, but from motives of self respect. Common honesty
should prevent a person who has agreed tc take his chance in a
combat and who comes off second best from violating a presumed
agreement not to sue his opponent; and the dignity of the law is
concerned in the suppression of such actions, founded both in illegality and in breach of faith.
The second group of cases of which the principal case is an
illustration, extends the doctrine of mutual affrays to illegal operations. Decisions on this subject are few, for the operations are
attended with the greatest secrecy, and it is to the interest of both
parties concerned that the facts be suppressed. The fear of social
degradation is sufficient to silence the woman; and in addition she is
amenable to the criminal law in some states as a participant in the
rFor cases holding a male person civilly liable for having had carnai
knowledge of a female under the statutory age of consent. see Altman v.
Eckermann, 132 S. W. 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910); Watson v. Taylor, 35 Okla.
768. 131 Pac. 922 (1913): Priboth v. Haveron, 41 Okla. 6g2-, 139 Pac. 973
(014) ; Hough v. Iderhoff. 0'9 Ore. 548. i39 Pac. 031 (1014) ; Boyles v. Blankenhorn. 16.1 App. Div. 3,Q. 153 N. Y. Supp. 466 (xi); Bishop v. Liston,
These cases proceed on the theory that a
,y) N. W. 825 (Neb. 94").
female of such tender years is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse,
and not on the ground that it is impossible to consent to an illegal act.
"Thuq. in Adams r. Waggoner. 33 Ind. 531 (1870), the defendant
stabbed the plaintiff during the mele with a knife. In Lizana v. Lang, 90
Miss. 460. 43 So. .177 (xoo7. the defendant struck the plaintiff with a pistol: in 'Milan v. Milan. 46 Wash. 468. 00 Pac. 595 (io7). he bit off a knuckle
of the plaintiffs hand during the fight: and in I-ewis v. Fountain, 168 X. C.

277 (1015), he shot the plaintiff, inflicting serious personal injuries. See
. 473 (884); Dole v. Eralso, Shay v. Thompson. 5q Wis. 540. I8 N.
skine, 35 N. H. 503 (1857); and Teolis v. Moscatelli, 1i9 Atl. 161 (R. .
1923).
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unlawful act."' If the operation has been successful, she is content,
notwithstanding the attendant danger and suffering; if unsuccessful,
she is afraid or ashamed to speak. It is therefore only in rare
cases, usually where the operation has resulted in the woman's
death, that the crime is detected. Some deterrent other than the
criminal law is obviously necessary. The two cases" which allow
a civil recovery by a woman who has consented to an abortion,
though they can no more be supported on principle than can the
cases which allow a recovery for injuries sustained in a mutual
affray, may well evidence a wise and sound policy bent on the suppression of these illegal acts. The fear of being compelled to pay
huge sunis to the victim or her family might deter physicians from
engaging iif these practices when the criminal law would not. On
the other hand, the dangerous 'weapon these decisions place in the
hands of unscrupulous women to feign complaints against physicians and ruin them, renders their salutary effect questionable.

J. M. M.
THE

ADMISSIBILITY

OF

UNCOMMUNICATF-D

TIIREATs.-As

stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, "there is some
conflict of authority as to the admission of threats of the deceased
against the prisoner in a case of homicide, where the threats had not
been communicated to him." '
The problem has been presented
again in the recent case of lVinner z'. Statc. Winner was indicted
for assault with intent to kill one Hawkins. Winner attempted to
show self-defense. A sharp conflict developed in the testimony
as to who had been the aggressor. The defendant offered testimony to the effect that shortly prior to the alleged assault, Hawkins had threatened to kill every union man in town. There was
no offer to prove that this threat had come to the knowledge of the
"1

C. J. 315.

"See

filler v. Bayer, 94 \is. 123. 68 N. \V. 869 (1896) in accord with
the principal case. For cases which refuse a civil recovery where the woman has consented, see Goldnamer v. O'Brien, 98 Ky. 569, 33 S. AV. 831 (180);
and Hunter v. Wheate, 53 App. D. C. 206, 289 Fed. 6o4 (1923).
Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S. 465 (1876). per Miller, .. , at page 466.
: z-; Adt. 397 (MNd. igz4).

so
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defendant, who, however, was admittedly within its scope because
he was a union man. The court held the testimony admissible.
Before marshaling the authority on the subject; it will be
well to examine the problem closely, in order to determine the
exact theory on which the evidence could be admissible. In the
first place, is the testimony relevant to any issue involved in the
plea of self-defense? Due to the fact that the threat was not
brought to the knowledge of the defendant, it cannot be relevant
to his state of mind." However, the threat is probative of the state
of mind of the person making it, 5 and if this state of mind embodies.
a plan, design or intention to attack the defendant, then this is ultimately probative of the actual commission of such an attack.6 .This
theory of a plan or design being probative of the commission of the
act planned, is nothing new or uncommon. It is well settled that
a testator's plan to make a will is competent evidence to show that
he actually made such a will,7 or that one's intent to make a certain
deed or contract is evidence that the intent was carried out.' It
would seem, therefore, that in any case of self-defense where there
is a question of who was the aggressor, uncommunicated threats
of the deceased are evidentiary of his state of mind, which is in
turn probative of the fact that he was the actual aggressor.
Assuming, then, that the relevancy of the uneommunicated
threats is thus established, there is still another objection to their
admission. The substance of the threat is "I intend to kill X,"
although it may be stated "I'll kill X" or "I'm going to kill X."
The threat is therefore a direct statement of the existence of a state
It will be noted that this was not a charge of homicide. although the
accused acted in self-defense. Since cases dealing with the subject are
usually homicide cases, and since the principle involved is the same wherever
the plea is self-defense, it will be most convenient to use the nomenclature
of a homicide case by terming the parties deceased and defendant, even
though in some cases they may be prosecutor and defendant.
'Whartoh. Criminal Evidence (oth ed., 1912), 1700-1711, points out
clearly the difference between communicated and uncommunicated threats
on this point. See also Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed., 1923), secs. iii and
247.

,State

v. Evans. 33 ,\.Va. 426. i0 S.E. 79-. per Lucas, J.: "Uncom-

mtnicated threats are evidence of the mental attitude of the deceased towards the prisoner."
*Wigmore. Evidence (2d ed., 923), sec. im1. Campbell v. People, 16
Ill. 1 (1854) ; Cornelius v. Comm., 15 B. Mon. 539 (Ky. '1855).
'Sugden v. St. Leonards. L. R. i P. D. 154 (1876); Gardner v. Gardner, 177 Pa. 2-R. 35 Ati. 5_S (&6); cf. Swope v. Donnelly, 190 Pa. 417,
42 Atl. 982 (1&,9).

'Aikin Y. Oil Co.. 189.Pa. 39. 41 Aft. .j7 (i

).
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of mind, and is offered to prove the truth of the fact stated. It
is therefore offered testimonially, 9 and being an extrajudicial
assertion, it is within the scope of the hearsay rule.10 However,
this difficulty is but momentary, for the statement is also within an
exception now as well established as the rule itself. The threats,
offered testimonially, are nothing but statements of a present, existing state of mind. An overwhelming mass of authority'admits such
statements as exception to hearsay,1 although some courts have
placed' limitations on this broad statement of the exception. 2
Hence it can safely be said that the uncommunicated threats,
being relevant and not under the proscription of any rule of exclusion, should be admitted on sound theory in all cases where
there is any question of whether the defendant or the deceased
was the aggressor. However, it is difficult to find a jurisdiction in
which this broad rule is sanctioned'Iby anything more substantial
than dicta.' 3 The actual decisions on the subject, although generally
accepting more or less clearly the theory of relevancy already stated,
almost invariably impose on it sundry limitations. These restrictions are so numerous 14 that only the most common ones can be
closely examined.
It is quite often stated that the evidence in question is not
admissible where the proof of the prisoner's aggression is beyond
doubt. 3 If this means that the admissibility is limited to cases
where there is an issue as to who was the aggressor, it is no doubt
sound, for this is the only issue to which the uncommunicated threats
are relevant. However, some courts have made the limitation cover
cases where the defendant desires to raise the question of aggression,
'Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 923), sec. 25.
"Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.. 1923). sec. i361. This brings out an
interestinz. though perhaps. academic distinction. If the threats, having
been comminicated to the defendant, are then offered to show his state of
mind, they are not within the hearsay rule: for not being offered to prove
the truth of the fact stated in the threat, they are not offered testimonially.
u Wigmore. Evidence (2d ed., 1923). sec. 1725.
1 Commonwealth v. .Trefethen. 157 Mass. 8o, 31 N. E. 961 (1892).
" Tn Washington. for instance, the Supreme Court admitted uncommunicated threats in White v. Territory. 3 Wash. Terr. 397, i9 Pac. 37 (i888),
saying that these are "admissible in all cases." Nine years later, the decision
in State v. Cushing, 17 Wash. z44, 5o Pac. 512 (1897), limited the earlier
dicta to communicated threats.
'Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed., 1923), sec. iii.
v. State, 34 Ark. 469 (1879); State v. Depaso. 45 La. Ann.
'Harris
11-1. T4 So. 77 0893): Johnson v. State, 54 Miss. 430 (1877).
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but has no evidence in his favor on the point other than the uncommunicated threats." In other words, the threats can
be used only
aggressor .2
the
was
deceased
the
that
to corroborate other evidence
It is submitted that this relegates the evidence to a position lower
than its true probative value on the accepted theory of relevancy.
A kindred limitation is that uncommunicated threats are adnissible only to corroborate communicated threats.'
If this proceeds on the theory that the two kinds of threats are relevant to the
same issue, it undoubtedly rests on a false foundation; for the communicated threats are admitted as relevant to the quo anhnzo of the
defendants, while those which were not communicated, are relevant
only to the plan or design of the deceased."" If, on the other hand,
this restriction is based on the idea that the uncommunicated threats
are useful only as relevYant to the question of whether the communicated threats were actually spoken, then it is submitted that this
also embodies too low an estimate of the probative value of the former, and incorrectly ignores their relevancy to the state of mind of
the deceased.
The only other limitation having much authority behind it, is
that the threats are admissible only if accompanied by some overt
act on the part of the deceased.20 In other words, the testimonial
evidence contained in the threat, and relevant to the state of mind of
the deceased, is not admissible unless accompanied by some conduct
tending circumstantially to prove the same state of mind. It may be
that this limitation is merely another failure to recognize the accepted
theory of the relevancy of the threats, with the resultant requirement that they be corroborated. However, when a court, in attempting to further define this limitation, states that the threats must be
part cf the "res gestae," 21 all semblance of soundness of theory
disappears. If the admissibility of this threat is to be determined
on the basis of whether they were spoken as part of the actual
affray under investigation, then their relevancy to a continuing plan
a State v. Alexander, 66 Mo. x48 (1877); State v. Thomas, 138 Mo. i68,
30 S. W. 459 (x8); Territory v. Tropp, 16 N. M. 7oo, x=o Pac. 702 (I9it).
"'Roberts v. State. 6 Ala. 163 (xiSo). The limitation is apparently

repudiated in State v. Rider. 95 3,o. 476. 8 S. W. 723 (1888). Cf. note 14.
"State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473 (1877); State v. Abbott, 8 NV. Va. 43
(2875).
" State v. Evans. 33 V. Va. 426. 10 S. E. 792 (1889).
'State v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148 (1877): Vaughan v. State, 88 Ga. 731,

16 S. E. 64 (89).
' Burns v. State. 43 Ala. 374 (1873).
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or design is not recognized. It is therefore submitted that this
limitation embodies either a false idea of probative value of the
threats, though admitting their relevancy to the question, or else it
embodies a complete repudiation of the accepted theory of relevancy.
In conclusion, it seems that while most courts accept the theory
of relevancy as first stated, they show a tendency to establish limitations and restrictions which are of less soundness than the theory
itself. Probably the fundamental reason for this tendency is a
feeling that the unrestricted admission of threats of a deceased would
encourage false pleas of self-defense, contrary to the best public
policy."2 It is submitted that Winner %. State, ,by adhering to the
broad theory of relevancy, and admitting the threats without any
narrow qualifications, rests on the best theoretical basis, and correctly leaves questions of public policy to be settled by the legislature.
U. E. G.
STOCK DISTRIBUTION

INCIDENTAL

TO A

REORGANIZATION" AS

INcOME UNDER TIE FEDERAL INcOME TAX AcTs.-Ordinary stock

dividends or distributions of stock by a corporation, which represent
a mere book transfer from surplus to capital account, were held
not to be income by the U. S. Supreme Court before the passage of
the Sixteenth Amendment.' The problem in the early decisions
was not one of taxation but involved the question of conflicting claims
to income by the holders of a life estate and those holding a reversionary interest. The question first arose as an income tax problem
under the Act of 1913 and was carried to the Supreme Court in
the case of Townze v. Eisner.2 In this case Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the court repeated and affirmed the doctrine laid
down in former decisions where the same question had arisen in
respect to the disputes between different interests as above indicated, saying, "A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the corporation and adds nothing to the interest of the shareholders. Its property is not diminished, and their interests are not
increased. .
The proportional interest of each stockholder
remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which represents that interest, the new shares and the original shares together
"Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.. 1923), sec. I1 (3).
'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 55, 56o (i8go).
See also L. R. A. 1918 D, 2_4.

'245 U. S. 418 (x918).
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representing the same proportional interest that the original shares
represented before the .issue of the new ones." 3
The decision in Tozwne v. Eisner had been under the 1913
Act in which there was no express provision for taxing stock dividends. The effect of this decision was reflected in the Income Tax
Act of 1916 which plainly evinced the purpose of Congress to tax
stock dividends as income. This clause, however, was declared invalid under the Constitution in the -celebrated case of Eishner v.
Macomber 5 and the doctrine of Tozzme v. Eisner was upheld.
Prior to this case the Supreme Court had held in Peabody z
Eisner' that a distribution by a corporation of stock of another independent corporation, which stock had been held by the distributing corporation in its treasury, was income to the recipient. This
decision is readily distinguishable from Eisner v. Macomber since
here there was a "distribution in specie" ' of a portion of the assets
of the corporation.
The question of distribution of stock of a separate company
formed from the assets of the parent company, arose next in two
cases decided the same day on the same principles, U. S. v. Phellis'
and Rockcfeller 7'. U. S.' In an opinion which has been the subject of a great deal of comment and criticism "o it was held by a
divided court that a dividend of stock in a new and separate company, formed by the segregation of part of the assets of the
original company, though having the same officers and the same
stockholders as that company, was not a stock dividend in the
sense of Eisner v. Macomber but was governed by the decision in

2 Id.426-Quoted from Gibbons v. Mahon. supra, note i.
'Rev.

Act of Sept. S. 1916. C. 463. 39 Stat. at L 756. After declaring

that dividends shall he included as "income," the act provides (sec. 2a) : "That
1he tcria 'dividends' aq used in this title shall be held to mepn any distributinn made or ordered to be made by a corporation . . . whether in cash
or in stock . . .

th5r U. S. VP9 (o2p'.
For full discussion of the development of the
theory of stock dividends leading up to this decision see: 33 HARv. L. REv.
S5; 20 COL L. Rv.v. 536; x8 MICH. L. REv. 689; 29 YALE L Joua.?. 75; 7
VA. L REv. x34; 68 U. op PA. L Rav. 394; 9 A. L. R. 157o, 1594.
247 U. S. 347 (1918).
"Id.. 350.
257 U. S. 156 (i92z).
'

257 U. S. 1,6 (1921).
For elaborate discussion and criticism of these cases see article by

Thomas Reed Powell. Income from Corporate Dividends, 35 HAEv. L REV.
363. See also i TF.x. L R-v.237; 7 IOWA L. But.. 185; 8 VA. L.Rv.44.

NOTES
Peabody -. Eisncr. The court held that the stock of the new com-

pany formed from the assets of the old stood in the place of those
assets and when distributed, constituted taxable gain to the recipients.
The attitude of Congress on this problem was manifested in a
new provision in the Income Tax Act of 1921 " providing that no
gain or loss should be recognized when in the reorganization of
one or more companies a person exchanges his old stock for new.
However, this left the anomalous situation of exempting from taxation exchanges between one or more corporations, and at the same
time, taxing dividends which were made as part of a reorganization
and which effected exactly the same result.
There have been two recent cases raising a similar problem and
in which the Supreme Court came to opposite conclusions. In Cullinan v. Walker1 2 an oil company was' dissolved and its assets turned
over to two new companies whose combined functions were the same
as those of the original company. The new companies turned over
equal amounts of their stock and bonds to a holding corporation
which in turn. distributed the bonds and its own stock to the original
shareholders. There was no change in total amount or value of the
assets. The court here held that the rule in U. S. v. Phellis governed, and that the fact that here there was a dividend in liquidation,
in place of a dividend in segregation of a portion of the company's assets, made no difference, and that the recipient was liable
to taxation on the amount by which the securities he received exceeded in value his original investment. Eisner v. Macomber was
distinguished on the ground that in this case the corporation whose
stock was distributed differed from the original company in that
(i) it was a holding company, not an operating company; (2) it
was organized under the laws of another state; (3) it was free at
any time to sell the stock of the new companies. 3
It is true that the stock which was distributed was the stock of
a holding company, but it was the sole function of this company to
hold the stock of, and correlate the activities of the two new com"Income Tax Act of 1921. 42 Stat. at L. 227, sec. 2o2 (c) (2). This
section provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized in the case of an
exchange "when in the reorganization of one or more corporations a person received in- place of any stock or securities owned by him, stock or securities in a corporation a party to or resulting from such reorganization."
U262 U.

S.

Id., 137.

134 (1923).
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panies whose combined functions, powers and assets were the
same as those of the dissolved corporation. It is true that the
corporation whose stock was distributed was organized in another
state, but this had been rejected as immaterial by the court in the
Rockefeller decision which had differed from the Phellis case in this
respect. 14 It is also true that the holding company could dispose
of its stock holdings at any time, but it is quite as true that the old
corporation could have disposed of its assets when and as it so desired. Consequently it would seem that the court disregarded its
oft reiterated principle that substance and not form should govern
in applying the provisions of the income tax, and based its decision
on the legal fiction of corporate entity.
It is indeed difficult to see in what way these corporations were
not "substantially identical" within the rule of the Southern Pacific23
and Gulf Oil 11 cases where inter-company dividends had been held
not taxable on that ground. In those cases the court said, "The
Central Pacific and the Southern Pacific were in substance identical
because of the complete ownership and control which the latter
possessed over the former, as a stockholder and in other capacities. While the two companies were separate legal entities, yet in
fact, and for all practical purposes they were merged. . .
The court points out that this case cannot be distinguished from
the Phcllis case on the ground that there the distributed stock of the
new corporation was "technically a dividend paid out of surplus,"
and goes on to say that "gain which when segregated becomes legally
income subject to the tax, may be segregated by a dividend in liquidation, as well as by the ordinary dividend." Admitting the gain
and its segregation it is quite evident that it does not matter by
what method the end is accomplished, but the court here assumes
that which it is vitally necessary to prove--the segregation.
However, the recent case of Weis v. Stearn " shows conclusively that the decision in Cullinaii v. Walker rested on the -inter14257 U. S. 183. "The facts are in all ess6ntials indistinguishable from
those presented in U. S. v. Phellis."
" Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330 (i918).
' Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71 (1918).
"Id., 337. See also Chicago. etc., Ry. v. Minn. Civic Assn., 247 U. S.
490, 5o (x18).
For recent notes on the tendency to limit the application
of the fiction of corporate entity see 72 U. or PA. L. Rm. 158; 56 CHic. L.

N. i.

25 U. S. 242, 44 Sup. Ct. 490 (May

-6, xgz4).

NOTES

position of the holding company between the new companies and
the old stockholders. In this case the entire assets of the old company were taken over by a new corporation. One-half of the stock
of this new corporation was distributed to the old stockholders, and
the other one-half was given to a third party for a cash consideration, which amount was in turn distributed among the stockholders
of the original corporation. The new company took over the entire
business and assets of the old, and continued under the same management. The court held that in effect the stockholders of the old
concern had sold one-half their stock for cash and exchanged the
other one-half for a like proportionate interest in the new corporation. In its opinion the court reverted to the principles of Eisner
v. Macomber and held that "having regard to the very truth of the
matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing that
answers the definition of income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Ahaendment." "I Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented on
the ground that the case was governed by Cullinan v. Walker.
The substantial justice and soundness of this decision seems
obvious under the reasoning of Eisner v. Macomber. Nothing was
taken from the corporation and nothing was given to the stockholders. The proportional interest of each stockholder remained
the same. No stockholder could dispose of his shares or any part
thereof without reducing his interest in the business, which business
was in substance the same -as that of the original corporation. It
is only when we compare it with its immediate predecessors that we
share the difficulty of Justices Brandeis and Holmes. The court in
Cullinan v. Walker based its decision primarily on the interposition of a holding company. We agree with the dissenting Justices
that this fact which alone distinguishes Weiss v. Steam therefrom
does not represent a difference which should ordinarily take the latter case from under the rule of the Cullinan decision. It is admittedly difficult to find a difference of substance between Cullinan v.
Walker and Weiss v. Steam, but would it not be even more difficult
to make the same sort of distinction between Eisner v. Macomber
and Weiss v. Stern? Indeed as already pointed out there is great
difficulty in differentiating between Eisner v. Macamber and Cidlinan
v. Walker, and a similar difficulty has been found by those who have
"Id., 491.
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attempted to reconcile with Eisner v. Maconber the Phellis case
upon which the Cullinan decision was based.
Consequently, although it may be doubtful whether there is a
substantial difference between the Cullinan and Weiss cases, yet, in
view of the former decisions which have held that the fiction of

corporate entity is sufficient to take a case out of the rule of Eisner
v. Macomber, it would seem that the opinion of the majority of the
court represented the more consistent view. It also seems clear
that in this case it represents the sounder view. There can be no

doubt as to the correctness of a refusal to extend by a principle of
substantial interpretation, a case which can only be recbnciled on a
strict construction of technical formalities of Organization.A
W. I. M.
ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETIES IN PERSONAL

PRoPERTY.-The

question of estates by the entireties in any sort of property, real or
personal, is one on which the courts are by no means agreed,' and
which widely varying interpretations of Married Women's Acts,
themselves practically uniform in their provisions,2 have served to
confuse to an even greater degree. There are four distinct kinds of
property in which this problem arises: real estate, property derived
from realty in one 3way or another,' choses in action unconnected
with real property, and personal property in possession. The first
is not here considered, except where necessary for an understanding of the others, and the fourth is of comparatively rare occurrence, so that we have to deal principally with choses in action,
which, for the purposes of this note, fall naturally into the two
groups mentioned above.
"The Income Tax Act of x924 repeats .the exemption given to "exchanges" of securities incidental to a reorganization and provides that these
sections shall apply to distributions in liquidation as well as in the case of
the ordinary exchange. The whole subject of stock distributions incidental
to a reorganization is treated in some detail. For new provisions, see sec.
2oi (c), (d), (g), and see. 2o3 (b), (2); (d) (i) and (2); (f), and (h),
() and (2).
'For a good discussion and full collection of cases, see .30 L R. A. 30.
'Infra, note 43.
'Usually a chose in action, such as notes and mortgages for the purchase money of an estate held by the vendors as tenants by the entireties,
but it may also consist of the crops from land so held, or rents from tenants on such estates.

NOTEs
N

Whether or not tenancy by the entireties in .personal property
existed at common law is much disputed.4 Blackstone nowhere
speaks of any such estate, though he discusses it at length in the
case of realty, and takes up the other kinds of estates in personalty,
(tenancy in common and joint tenancy among the others), and the
complete silence, on this point, of so eminent an authority, is strong,
if only negative, evidence. On the other hand, there are' many cases•
which seem to admit of no other explanation than that of such a
tenancy in personal property, even though it is not called by that
name in the reports.' In view of these apparently conflicting authorities, it seems probable that the true explanation is to be found
in the complete control which the husband exercised over all his
wife's property at common law. In real estate held by the entireties,
the husband had the sole right to the rents and profits, and the sole
power of control, with the exception that he could not, without the
consent of the wife, dispose of the estate, so as to bar her interest
in the land in case she survived him. So also, the husband dealt
with choses in action as he pleased, and could, (unlike the situa-

tion in the case Pf real estate), act for his wife as well (since her
identity was merged with his) in reducing them to possession, and
it is clear that she could not own any personal property in posses-

sion.' There is, then, strong ground for the view that tenancy by
the entireties, at least in choses in action, existed at common law,
and it is 7 difficult to find any other explanation for the cases referred to.
The history of the doctrine of tenancy by the entireties in personal property in the Pennsylvania cases fails to show any logical
basis for- its existence. The problem seems to have been first
squarely presented in Gillan's Ex'rs. v'. Dixon.' In deciding; the
'Freeman,

Cotenancy and Partition, sec. 68; Bishop, Law of Married

Women, vol. I, sec. 211; 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 328.
'Draper v. Jackson, 16 Afass. 479 (1820), and cases there cited; Com.

Dig. tit. Baron & Feme, Fr, V and X, and cases there cited. These cases

deal mainly with choses in action, and in each of them it was held that the
wife took the entire interest in such property upon the death of her hus-

band, the instruments having stood in the joint name.

BI. Corn. (Sharswood's ed.) 433-434, and note.
'Supra, note S.
'65 Pa. 395 (i87o). The testator's daughter died owning two promissory
notes and leaving the testator and his wife her sole heirs at law. Before
administration of her estate the father died and the question was whether
the notes passed" into his estate or went to the wife as survivor.
'2
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court says merely: "This (that an estate by the entireties exists) is
well settled both as to real and personal estate" and cites to sustain
the proposition several cases, all of which deal, in point of fact,
with realty. The matter does not seem to have arisen again for some
time, but in Bramberry's Estate 9 it was again directly in litigation,
and the court held as in Gillan v. Dixon,' the only case cited by it.
Parry's Estate,2 the next case in this line, relies upon Bramberry's
Estate 12 and a quotation fr6m a text-writer,13 without any independent investigation. On the basis of these three cases rests the
entire Pennsylvania law on the subject. Klcnke's Estate,"4 in which
judgment was affirmed, without discussion, on the opinion of the
court below, cites to support the general proposition (that estates by
the entireties exist in personal property) only Parry's Estate 25 and
Donnelly's Estate, and extends the doctrine to the situation where
a bank account is in the joint names of husband and wife, -either or
both of whom may draw upon the account. It cites no cases, either
from this or other jurisdictions, but reasons merely that the deposits
were made to the credit of either or both, so that withdrawals in
this manner were authorized (which is beside the point, since the
court is not determining whether or not the bank was authorizd, but
whether an estate by the entireties exists in such a situation). Furthermore, in this case there was an express agreement that the survivor should be permitted to withdraw the account. Two other cases
decided in the Sureme Court of Pennsylvania have reached the same
conclusion under similar circumstances: Blick v. Cockins,27 and
c
Sloan's Estate
28 The former is a per curiam affirmation on the
$5 Pa. 68, 27 AtI. 405 (i893). A purchase money mortgage for land
held by the vendors as tenants by the entireties is held by them in the - same
way.

Supra, note &
188 Pa. 33, 41 At. 448 (1898).

Aletter of credit made payable to hus-

band and wife is an estate by the entireties.
"Supra, note &
Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition, secs. 63-68.
Pa. 572, 6o Atl. 166 (ix0o).
Supra, note i.

14 2io
'

'7 Pa. C. C. x96 ( 8g). This case rests in turn solely upon Gillan v.
Dixon, supra, note 8. Itholds that a savings account, payable to either husband or wife or the survivor, makes them tenants by the entireties.
25.- Pa. 56, 97 Atl. 125 (ixg6). The bank account in this case -Was
subject to the order of either or the survivor.
"254 Pa. 46, 98 Atl. 966 (i9i6). The bank account here was "payable to the order of W,\:illiara
Sloan or wife."

NOTES

opinion of the court below, which 'on this point says only: 'Ve
(withdrawal by either)
are of opinion, however, that this
makes no difference, and even if all . . . (had been de*
posited) . . . by the wife it would now belong to the survivor."
The other case rests upon those which have been discussed, and
cites only Klcnke's Estate "I in support of the proposition that the
fact of either the husband or wife being able to withdraw by individual check is unimportant. These cases are cited again in Re
Rhodes' Estate,20 and their doctrine is still the law of this state.
In two cases in the Pennsylvania County Courts,2 ' the fact of
which are essentially identical, this doctrine was applied in a situation which clearly reveals one of its defects. A husband and wife
had a joint bank account, to which each had contributed part and
upon which each had in the past drawn individual checks, subject,
by arrangement with the bank, to the check of either or both. The
plaintiff had a judgment against the husband, and sought to issue
attachment execution. It was held that the bank account was an
estate by the entireties and therefore exempt from attachment execution for the separate debts of the husband. In Zelt v. Washing-_
ton National Bank,2 2 the court merely quotes from the standard
texts on tenancy by the entireties in real property, and from the
cases discussed above holding that it may exist in personalty, and
appears to find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
spouses may give their consent by parol and in advance to the disposition of the estate by the other's individual check. The other
court"-' finds a real difficulty, and inclines to hold this not a tenancy by the entireties, but considers itself bound by the unqualified
declaration of the Supreme .Court ii' Sloan's Estate."2 Against the
view that such an account is held by the entireties it cites Watts v.
"Supra, note 14.
"277 Pa. 45o, 12 At. 327 (923).

'Williams v. Bross, 4 Pa. D. & C. 496 (ig4z); Zelt v. Washington National Bank, 4 Pa. D. & C. 746 (1923). It is interesting to note that this
phase of the problem, i. e., an attempt by a creditor of one spouse to attach
the joint bank account, was not presented to any of the courts which decided
the early cases on the subject. If it had been, their decision might have
been different.
"Supra, note 2z.
"Williams v. Bross, supra, note

'Supra, note MB.

2!.
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Horn 25 and a dictum in Osterling v. Van Arsdale 21 which declares
that had the account in that case been subject to the check of either
party the situation would have been entirely different.
From the above survey, there seems to be little doubt that the
Pennsylvania courts have gone astray on this subject, beginning with
Gillan z,. Dizon,' 7 but that the rule is now too firmly embedded to be
changed by judicial decision. The extension of the doctrine to the
case where either may draw on the account by individual check is
more recent, and, it is submitted, a much more dangerous error. A
fund which may be drawn upon by either husband or wife at will,
as if it were the personal property of either one, and which is safe
from attachment by the creditors of either, is an open door to
fraud which is certain to be used to the utmost by the unscrupulous,
so that much injustice and hardship can scarcely fail to result.
The majority view, in other jurisdictions, appears to be that
tenancies by the entireties exist in personal property. While many
of the cases deal with property derived from real estate"2 or
with choses in action, -9 rather than with property in possesssion,30
the language employed is often broad enough to cover both situations. Massachusetts early committed itself to the doctrine that
31
such tenancy in personal property exists, and has never receded
32
from that position, but'it has refused to go as far as Pennsylvania

2 30

Pa. D. R. 325 (192o).

The main point in the reasoning is that since

either has absolute control of the fund, it should be subject to the debts
of either.
7o Pitts. L. J. 97 (Pa. 1922).
"Supra, note &
"Union Trust Co. v. Hudson, 147 Ark. 7. 227 S. W. I (xg2x); Kochring v. Bowman, 142 N. E. 117 (Ind. 1924); Masterman v. Masterman, z29

Md. 167, 98 Atl. 537 (x916) ; Brell v. Brell, i43 Md. 443, 122 At!. 633 (1923)
Craig v. Bradley, 153 Mo. App. 586, 134 S. N,\. io8i (igi);
ton, 94 Vt. 76, io8 At. Si5 (9¢2o).

;

George v. Dut-

"Dupont v. Jonet, i6. Wis. 554, x62 N. AV. 664 (1917); Craig v. Bradley, supra, note 28; Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 AtL io6o (i9o);.
Ward v. Ward. L. R. 14 Ch. D. 5o6 (08o); Dickson v. Jonesboro Trust Co.,
154 Ark. 155, 242 S. W. 57 (1922).
"Flaherty v. Columbus, 4! App. D. C. 52.5 (i914).
' Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 479 (1820).

"Boland

v. McKowen, 189 Mass. 563, -6 -. E. 2o6 (i9o5).
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has done,3 and it seems quite certain that its courts have gone as

far in favor of this sort of tenancy as they ever will. New York
has considered that such property of husband and wife is held by
them as joint tenants, even in the case of a mortgage,3 ' and therefore the property goes to the surviving spouse only in case the
'New Jersey holds that
other has not aliened his or her interest."
tenancy by the entireties can exist only in real property. and not
even in rents and profits from land held by the entireties, which are
In Illinois, by
held by husband and wife as tenants in common.
an old statute, all rights of survivorship were abolished, and the restoring statute of 1872 was held to apply only to real property T In
England, before the passage of the 'Married Women's Property Act

of 1882, an estate by the entireties in an annuity was recognized, 3
but, although that act was expressly declared not to destroy the unity
of husband and wife,39 it seems that the more recent cases proceed
on the theory of a joint tenaicy and not on that of entireties.' 0

Those jurisdictions which refuse to acknowledge the existence of
such an estate base their view on several different reasons: that it
never existed at common law,"' that it is abolished either expressly
or by interpretation of statutes relating to joint ownership, 42 or by
"Marble v. Jackson. 2j. .Mass. "o4, 13 xN F_ 442 (1923). which, under
facts precisely like those of Sloan's Estate, .supra, note 18, mentions that case
by name and refuses to follow it.
"Re Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 9r, 32 N. E. 632 (1892).
"Matter of McKelway. 221 N. Y. 5. 116 N. E. 348 (1917).
M
Aubry v. Schneider, 69 N. J. Eq. 69. 6o Atl. 9--9 (i9os). The tenancy by the entireties referred to in the case of real estate is not in fact such,
but a joint tenancy, since either can dispose of his or her interest. Zubler
v. Porter, 12o Atl. 194 (N. J. 2923).
'Lemen v. Grote's Estate. 2o3 1Il. App. _o (i916). But in Reder v.
Reder, 312 11. 209. 143 N. E. 418 (I924). it was held that deposits made

by husband and wife in a joint savings account, payable (by direction) to
either or the suivivor. would pass to the survivor according to the agreement, the situation being treated on the basis of mutual completed gifts
(which leads into difficulties), though exactly like Klenke's Estate, jupra,
note 14.

log.

"Vard v. Ward. L R. 14 Ch. Div. 5o6 (M88o).
"Jupp v." Buckwell. L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 148 (i888).
M'Dowell v. M1'.Neilly, (iqi7)
1 I. R. 117; In re Hood, (1923)
"Stout v. Van Zante, 1o9 Ore. 430, 219 Pac. %4 (1923).
'Swan v. Walden, 1.6 Cal. z93. io3 Pac. 931 (i9o9).

1 1. R.
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the Mlarried Women's Acts,' 3 or simply on the ground of policy."6
Some jurisdictions admit such an estate in personal property even
though it has been abolished in realty, and there are hardly two
jurisdictiofis to be found in which the rule on the subject is the
5

same.

The history of this subject is a very peculiar one, since it has
become of importance (by the operation of the Married Women's
Acts) only as tenancy by the entireties in real property, of which
it is the offspring, declined in importance and in many instances was
abolished by statute or judicial action. There seems to be little
to be said in favor of this sort of an estate in personalty. On the
theory that cessante ratione legis cessat ct ipsa le.r, it has no reason
for further existence, since the conferring of a separate identity
upon married women by the acts relating to them. Moreover, it
serves no useful purpose, as it did when th wife could acquire no
personal property of her own and it guarded against actual want
after the husband's death, the wife now having separate property
for her own use, and being legally an entirely distinct person, so
that in strict theory the now almost universal statutory prohibitions on joint estates should apply. There is little doubt that in
many jurisdictions this theory obtained its foothold in the law by
its application where a mortage was given to husband and wife
jointly. In such a situation many jurisdictions, a hundred years
ago, regarded the mortgage as an estate in realty (the actual title
being conveyed) which could be held by the entireties, and from this
they began to apply the doctrine to notes secured by the mortgage
and to other choses in action. Today, in a great majority of jurisdictions, that reason has likewise disappeared. But the most seri'Semper v. Coates, 93 Minn. 76, ToO N. W. 66z (i904). These Married Women's Acts. though so differently construed are practically identical
in their language, each providing that a married woman shall have the right
of acquiring, managing and disposing of her property as ifsingle, without
the control of her husband and without liability for his debts. For typical
examples, see (Enzland) 45 and 46 Vict. C. 75. I; (Mass.) Revised Laws
of 1902, c. 153, 1: (N. Y.) Consolidated Laws of i9og (Domestic Relations
Law) c. 14. 5o; (Penna.) Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344.
'Turlington v. Lucas. 186 N. C. -8R3. ii S. E. 366 (1923); WhittlesIcy v. Fuller, xx Conn. 337 (IR36): Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich..425 (1877);
but in M[urphy v. Iichigan Trust Co., :-r Mfich. 243, i9o N. IV. 698 (1922).
there was a strong dictum to the effect that a tenancy by the entireties would
be recognized in a bank account pay-able only to the order of both.
See cases collected in Union Trust Co. v. Hudson, supra. note 28, and
those in a note in 8 A. L. R. OI7, where also will be found a good discussion of the subject.

NOTES
ous objection to what would otherwise be merely an innocuous relic
of an earlier age, useless but interesting, is that suggested above in
the discussion of the Pennsylvania cases. While most jurisdictions
which admit tenancy by the entireties in choses in action refuse
to consider a bank account, upon which either husband or wife may
draw, such an estate," yet even in the more usual form there is obvious danger of fraud, since the wife (or husband, if the case is reversed) will usually be willing to join her husband in drawing a
check or disposing of the chose in action. In the usual view of
the matter, such property is equally immune from judgment creditors of the husband and his trustee in bankruptcy, 4- and that view is
the only one which can possibly be reached if it is admitted that
such a chose in action is held by the entireties.' 8 It seems, therefore, that tenancy by the entireties in personal property is a doctrine
which has long since outlived its usefulness (if, indeed, it existed at
the time when it would have been useful), and which now can
only result in fraud of creditors of husband or wife, or, even
where no fraud is actually intended or committed, in a deceptive
appearance of credit of the spouse with whom such creditors are
dealing. It should therefore be refused recognition by the courts,
or, where it is too firmly imbedded to make that feasible, should be
abolished by legislative enactment.

H. C.R.
'Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., supra, note 44: Marble v. Jackson,
supra, note 33; Brewer v. Bowersox, supra, note 29. Contra, Sloan's Estate,

supra. note x8; Dickson v. Jonesboro Trust Co., supra, note 29.
"Cases cited supra, in note 21, and see cases collected in Ann. Cas.
1912 C,

124.

'Contra,

in New Jersey, see supra, note 36.

